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INTEREST OF AMICI 
Amici, historians and scholars with expertise in 
constitutional law and the electoral process, submit this 
brief in support of the Presidential Electors.1 The brief 
explains the rich, nuanced historical backdrop that must 
inform the Court’s consideration of this case. 
Michael L. Rosin is an independent scholar who 
has analyzed historical source material about the origins 
of the Electoral College, proposed and adopted 
constitutional amendments, and congressional debate on 
disputed electoral votes. This brief draws on Mr. Rosin’s 
detailed research. 
David G. Post was I. Herman Stern Professor at 
Beasley School of Law, Temple University, before 
retiring in 2015.  He is affiliated with the Center for 
Democracy and Technology, the Institute for Information 
Law and Policy at New York Law School, and the Cato 
Institute. He has authored numerous academic works and 
has submitted several amicus briefs to the Court. 
David F. Forte is Professor of Law at Cleveland 
State University, teaching courses on constitutional law, 
the Federalist Papers, and the presidency. He has 
authored and edited works concerning the original 
understanding of the Constitution. 
Michael Stokes Paulsen is Distinguished 
University Chair and Professor of Law at the University 
 
1 All parties have filed written consents to the filing of briefs by amici 
curiae with the Clerk of the Court. No party nor party’s counsel 
authored this brief in whole or in part, or made a monetary 
contribution intended to fund its preparation or submission. No 
person other than amici or their counsel made a monetary 
contribution to its preparation or submission. 
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of St. Thomas.  He is a constitutional law scholar, author 
of more than ninety articles, and co-author of a leading 
casebook on the constitution.  His published work on the 
constitutional voting autonomy of electors predates these 
litigations.  Paulsen, The Constitutional Power of the 
Electoral College (Public Discourse, Nov. 21, 2016), 
https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2016/11/18283/. 
Sotirios Barber is Professor of Political Science at 
the University of Notre Dame. He has authored 
numerous works on constitutional theory, law, and 
interpretation and held fellowships from the National 
Endowment for the Humanities and the American 
Council of Learned Societies. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Framers of the Constitution crafted the 
Electoral College to be an independent institution with 
the responsibility of selecting the President and Vice-
President. Therefore, they intended each elector to 
exercise independent judgment in deciding whom to vote 
for. A state cannot revise the Constitution unilaterally by 
reducing the elector to a ministerial agent who must vote 
in a particular way or face a sanction. The question of each 
elector’s moral or political obligation is not before the 
Court. Nor is the desirability of the current electoral 
system. Rather, this case turns on what the Constitution 
allows, and what it prohibits. The historical record 
strongly supports the notion that the Constitution allows 
an elector to exercise independent judgment and 
prohibits a State from interfering with an elector’s ability 
to do so—a position Congress has consistently reaffirmed. 
First, the Framers intended each elector to be 
independent and entitled to vote freely. Article II’s plain 
- 3 - 
language, along with contemporaneous historical 
evidence from ratification through the first several 
elections, demonstrates this common understanding and 
negates the notion of an elector as a ministerial 
functionary.  
Second, Congress’s debates on adopted and 
proposed constitutional amendments reflect the same 
understanding. Before approving the Twelfth 
Amendment, Congress discussed the elector’s role, 
ultimately requiring each elector to designate votes 
between President and Vice-President. Those debates did 
not evince a desire to control an elector’s votes or 
empower states to do so. The 1961 debates on 
implementing the Twenty-Third Amendment, which 
provided electors to the District of Columbia, reflected 
the same view. At most, a state’s pledging requirements 
exert only a “moral suasion” over an elector’s choices. 
Likewise, congressional debates on proposed 
amendments consistently reflect the view that electors 
enjoy constitutionally guaranteed discretion in casting 
their votes.  
Third, the results of the electoral process time and 
again reaffirm this constitutional independence. Congress 
has never declined to count an electoral vote because the 
elector did not vote for a particular (living) person. This is 
true even when that elector voted for a person other than 
the person he or she previously pledged to vote for.2 
Indeed, Congress has only once even debated whether to 
accept an anomalous vote (and decided to accept it). In 
contrast, the historical record reveals a number of 
 
2 Throughout this brief, we use the term “anomalous” to describe such 
an elector, or such an electoral vote. Electors casting votes of this 
nature, and the votes themselves, are often referred to as “faithless” 
electors or votes. 
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instances in which Congress debated whether to accept 
electoral votes for other reasons (e.g., when electoral 
votes were cast a day late). 
This robust historical record supports only one 
conclusion: Our constitutional framework allows each 
elector to vote as he or she chooses.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Framers Intended Each Elector To 
Exercise Independent Judgment. 
The Constitution authorizes “[e]ach state” to 
“appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may 
direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number 
of Senators and Representatives to which the State may 
be entitled in the Congress . . . .” U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, 
cl. 2 (the “Elector Clause”). The contemporaneous 
historical record shows that the Framers crafted and 
adopted the Elector Clause with the understanding that 
they were empowering each elector, once appointed, to 
vote freely based on their considered judgment.  
A. The Federalist Papers and Other 
Contemporaneous Evidence Establish That the 
Framers Intended Each Elector to Exercise 
Independent Judgment. 
The Constitution’s plain language authorizes each 
state’s legislature to decide how to choose its state’s 
electors but not how each elector may or must vote. U.S. 
Const., Art. II, § 1, cl. 2. Instead, Article II constrains an 
elector’s voting in only two respects: He or she must (1) 
vote for two persons, (2) at least one of whom is not an 
inhabitant of the same state as the elector. Id. cl. 3. Article 
II contains no further limit on an elector’s voting choices, 
nor does it confer state power to impose such limits. 
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Indeed, the Constitution’s bar against holders of federal 
“Offices of Trust or Profit” from serving as electors only 
makes sense if electors are empowered to vote as they 
choose and not mere ministerial agents. Id. cl. 2; see 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) 
(“It cannot be presumed that any clause in the 
constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore 
such a construction is inadmissible, unless the words 
require it.”).  
The Federalist Papers envision the electors as a 
group of individuals chosen by their fellow citizens to 
exercise reasoned judgment in selecting the president 
and vice-president. For example, Alexander Hamilton 
wrote that “so important a trust” should only be 
“confided” to “[a] small number of persons, selected by 
their fellow-citizens from the general mass . . . .” The 
Federalist No. 68 (A. Hamilton). Each should be “most 
capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the station” 
of president and vice-president. Id. Such a group, 
reasoned Hamilton, “will be most likely to possess the 
information and discernment requisite to such 
complicated investigations.” Id. Hamilton describes the 
hallmarks of independent decision-making, envisioning 
electors “acting under circumstances favorable to 
deliberation, and to a judicious combination of all the 
reasons and inducements which were proper to govern 
their choice.” Id.; see also The Federalist No. 64 (J. Jay) 
(envisioning “an assembly of select electors [who] possess, 
in a greater degree than kings, the means of extensive and 
accurate information relative to men and characters”).  
The election of 1789—the nation’s first presidential 
election—provides key contemporaneous evidence of the 
Framers’ design. As that election unfolded, Hamilton 
explained that, “[e]very body is aware of that defect in the 
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constitution which renders it possible that the man 
intended for Vice President may in fact turn up President. 
Everybody sees that unanimity in Adams as Vice 
President and a few votes insidiously withheld from 
Washington might substitute the former to the latter.” 
Letter from Alexander Hamilton to James Wilson (Jan. 
25, 1789), in 5 The Papers of Alexander Hamilton 248 
(Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962). Hamilton concluded that it 
would “be prudent to throw away a few votes” for vice 
president to avoid this possibility. Id. at 248–49.3 
Hamilton’s timing here is significant: he wrote the 
language quoted above on January 25, 1789, after the 
presidential electors were appointed but before they 
voted. See 34 Journals of the Continental Congress 522-
23 (1788) (setting out 1789 election timeline). 
Some electors followed Hamilton’s suggestion. 
While all 69 voted for Washington, they split their second 
votes among John Adams, John Hancock, John Jay, and 
eight others. 1 Annals of Cong. 17 (1789). Adams easily 
outpaced the field with 34 votes, making him Vice-
President. Id. A Boston newspaper, discussing the non-
Adams votes cast by electors from Connecticut, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania, “supposed” that the electors 
“really wish[ed] to have Mr. Adams Vice-President, and 
would have been unanimous for him, had they not been 
fearful it might have excluded the Great Washington from 
the Presidential Chair.” 4 DHFFE 180 (quoting the 
Independent Chronicle (Boston) (Feb. 19, 1789)). Adams 
himself, unhappy about the vote count, chalked it up to a 
 
3 Hamilton was not the only, or the first, observer to comment on this 
possibility. See 4 The Documentary History of the First Federal 
Elections 53, 56, 125, 143-44 (Gordon DenBoer, Merrill Jensen, & 
Robert A. Becker eds., 1990) (describing five letters or commentaries 
between August 1788 and January 1789) (“DHFFE”); accord, 2 
DHFFE 186. 
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“dark and dirty Intrigue” designed to “Spread a Panick 
least I should be President, and G.W. Vice President . . . 
.” Id. at 285. The constitutional “defect” and remedy of 
“throw[ing] away a few votes,” and the public discussion 
around the 1789 election, make sense only on the premise 
that each elector was free to choose how to vote.  
B. Contemporaneous State Constitutional 
Provisions Modeled and Reflected Elector 
Independence. 
Maryland’s electoral process likely served as a 
model for the system ultimately enshrined in Article II. 
The Maryland Constitution explicitly envisioned each 
elector voting according to his “judgment and conscience” 
in electing state senators. Md. Const. of 1776, Art. XVIII. 
The Framers were undoubtedly aware of this system, and 
it likely informed their design of the electoral college. See 
Robert J. Delahunty, Is the Uniform Faithful 
Presidential Electors Act Constitutional?, Cardozo L. 
Rev. De Novo 165, 171-72 (2016); see also 6 The Life and 
Correspondence of Rufus King 532-34 (Charles R. King 
ed., 1900) (“[I]n this way the Senate of Maryland is 
appointed; and it appears . . . Hamilton proposed this very 
mode of choosing the Electors of the President.”).  
Similarly, in 1792, the newly created state of 
Kentucky adopted an electoral college to choose its state 
senators and governor. Its constitution charged state 
electors “to elect, without favor, affection, partiality, or 
prejudice, such person for governor, and such persons for 
senators, as they in their best judgment and conscience 
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believe best qualified for the respective offices.” See Ky. 
Const. of 1792, Art. I, § 14, Art. II, § 2.4  
Colorado relies on state legislation from the early 
republic in support of its position, but also recognized that 
those early statutes “deal primarily with replacing and 
fining absent electors,” functions entirely consistent with 
elector independence. See Colo. Dep’t of State v. Baca, No. 
19-518, Pet. for Cert. at 24-25 (emphasis added). By 
establishing consequences for electors who failed to show 
up or fulfill their role, those statutes properly exercised 
the states’ power to appoint without attempting to control 
any elector’s votes. See Consol. Opening Br. for 
Presidential Electors at 19-23 (contrasting powers to 
appoint electors and control their votes). For example, 
Massachusetts legislation recognized that “it may so 
happen that one or more of the electors of President and 
Vice-President may be prevented by death, sickness[,] 
resignation or otherwise from attending on the day 
appointed to give their votes.” 1800-1801 Mass. Acts 172-
73. The state then “Resolved That the said Electors . . . 
who may then and there be present are hereby 
empowered to fill up all vacancies which may happen as 
aforesaid . . . by ballot from the people at large so many 
suitable persons for Electors of president and vice-
president.” Id. at 173. Nothing in this resolve suggests a 
power to replace an elector for anything but absence, nor 
to direct or influence how any elector votes. 
Colorado also wrongly claims that early electors in 
Kentucky could “be replaced,” citing a 1799 law. Baca, 
Pet. for Cert. at 25. The relevant statute said nothing 
about replacement, nor purported to control any elector’s 
 
4 In 1799, Kentucky scrapped its electoral college altogether in favor 
of direct election of senators and the governor. See Ky. Const. of 1799, 
Art. II, § 14, Art. III, § 2. 
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votes. It simply provided that an elector “failing to 
perform the duties herein required, and also the duties 
prescribed by the laws of congress regulating his conduct, 
… shall forfeit and pay one hundred dollars . . . .” 2 
William Littell, Statute Law of Kentucky, ch. CCXII, § 20, 
at 352 (1810). And it clarified that when electors actually 
“proceed to the election of a president,” they do so 
“pursuant to the constitution and laws of congress for 
regulating their conduct,” id., not any state law 
purporting to compel their votes. See also id. § 19 (stating 
that every four years qualified voters shall “vote for some 
discreet and proper person . . . as an elector . . . to vote for 
a president of the United States, in conformity to the 
constitution and laws of congress.”). In short, the 
Kentucky statute did not authorize the state to replace, or 
control the votes of, electors, but instead recognized them 
as free to vote under federal law.  
II. Congress Has Consistently Recognized and 
Maintained Elector Independence. 
  Congress’s debates and actions over time are 
uniformly consistent with the Framers’ understanding 
that an elector’s voting choices cannot be bound by state 
law. Recognition of elector independence is a constant 
theme through the crafting and implementing of the 
Twelfth and Twenty-Third Amendments, and Congress’s 
consideration of would-be amendments.  
A. The Twelfth Amendment Was Adopted to Prevent 
Strategic Partisan Voting Without Limiting Elector 
Independence. 
Presidential elections held before ratification of 
the Twelfth Amendment all saw electors cast anomalous 
votes. In 1796, electors casting undesignated votes elected 
the losing party’s presidential candidate as vice-president 
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alongside the winning party’s presidential candidate.  In 
1800, Aaron Burr almost won the presidency in the House 
and possibly in the Electoral College itself, nearly 
inverting the Jefferson-Burr ticket. Congress could have 
eliminated the partisan scheming that affected the 1796 
and 1800 elections by limiting elector independence or 
authorizing states to control the votes of electors. It did 
neither.  
Instead, Congress adopted the Twelfth 
Amendment, which requires each elector to designate his 
or her votes for president and vice-president. This reform 
presumed each elector could vote independently and 
changed the rules to deter the partisan tactics of the prior 
elections.  Indeed, the historical record reveals that no 
member of the Seventh or Eighth Congress suggested 
that state law could bind an elector’s votes, pledged or not. 
See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 980 (1991) 
(“The actions of the First Congress . . . are of course 
persuasive evidence of what the Constitution means . . . 
.”). Understood in historical context, the Twelfth 
Amendment is a resounding affirmation of elector 
independence.  
1. The 1796 and 1800 elections 
The 1796 election featured the greatest variety of 
anomalous votes, and remains the only election resulting 
in a president and vice-president from different parties. 
Many of the anomalous votes were examples of partisan 
jockeying: For example, Alexander Hamilton successfully 
persuaded South Carolina’s eight electors to vote for 
Jefferson and Federalist Thomas Pinckney (Adams’s 
running mate). About thirty more Jefferson electors cast 
their second votes for someone other than running mate 
Aaron Burr. In anticipation of Hamilton’s ploy, some 
Federalist electors sloughed off their votes for Pinckney.  
- 11 - 
All told, as many as 59 electors cast anomalous votes. 
Other than Adams, Pinckney, Jefferson, and Burr, at 
least nine other persons received votes. When the dust 
settled, Adams and Jefferson received the first and 
second highest electoral vote totals.5   
By contrast, the 1800 election featured only a 
single anomalous vote. Yet, unlike 1796, this election 
caused great alarm because Aaron Burr nearly bested 
Thomas Jefferson for the presidency by capitalizing on 
Hamilton’s “defect.” Jefferson and Burr defeated Adams 
and his running mate Charles Pinckney, but Jefferson 
and Burr each received 73 votes, sending the election to 
the House of Representatives, which took 36 ballots 
before finally electing Jefferson president. 10 Annals of 
Cong. 1025-33 (1801). 
In the wake of the election, stories surfaced of 
Burr’s efforts to persuade electors to vote anomalously 
and swing the presidency to him. See 36 Papers of 
Thomas Jefferson 82–88 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950) 
(hereafter Boyd); James Cheetham, A View of the 
Political Conduct of Aaron Burr, Esq. Vice President of 
the United States 44 (1802) (hereafter Cheetham). For 
example, in December 1801, New York journalist James 
Cheetham wrote to President Jefferson that Anthony 
Lispenard, a Jefferson-Burr elector in New York, almost 
cast his votes for Burr and a third candidate, but DeWitt 
Clinton forced the New York electors to display their 
ballots to each other. Boyd at 82–88. Cheetham also 
claimed that Burr had attempted to recruit New Jersey 
and South Carolina Federalist electors to change their 
 
5 For an overview of the 1796 electoral vote, see Jeffrey L. Pasley, 
The First Presidential Contest: 1796 and the Founding of American 
Democracy 348–404 (Kansas 2013). See also Consol. Opening Br. for 
Presidential Electors at 33–35 & App. B (listing anomalous votes). 
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votes from Pinckney to Burr. Cheetham at 43-45. Had 
even one elector switched his vote, Burr would have been 
elected president by the Electoral College.  
Although some historians doubt the veracity of 
Cheetham’s claims, see, e.g., Milton Lomask, 1 Aaron 
Burr 322 (1979), their truth is beside the point. It is 
undisputed that such accounts were in the air.  For 
example, Albert Gallatin wrote to Thomas Jefferson in 
1801 expressing concern that the Federalists might 
connive to make Aaron Burr president in the next 
election. 
[I]t seems to me that there are but two ways, 
either to support Burr once more, or to give 
only one vote for President, scattering our 
votes for the other person to be voted for. If we 
do the first, we run, on the one hand, the risk of 
the federal party making B. president; & we 
seem, on the other, to give him an additional 
pledge of being eventually supported hereafter 
by the republicans for that office. If we 
embrace the last party, we not only lose the 
Vice President, but pave the way for the federal 
successful candidate to that office to become 
President. All this would be remedied by the 
amendt. of distinguishing the votes for the two 
offices . . . .  
35 Boyd at 286. Jefferson responded that “the amendment 
to the constitution of which you speak would be a remedy 
to a certain degree.” 35 Boyd at 314. His response also 
touted “a different amendment which I know will be 
proposed, to wit, to have no electors, but let the people 
vote directly, and the ticket which has a plurality of the 
votes of any state, to be considered as receiving thereby 
the whole vote of the state.”Id.  
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2. Congress did not consider limiting elector 
independence as a response to concerns about the 
early elections. 
Congress could have addressed the concerns 
raised by the 1796 and 1800 elections by binding electors 
or eliminating them altogether.6 Instead, it adopted the 
Twelfth Amendment, directing each elector to designate 
one vote for president and one for vice-president—an 
approach entirely consistent with and supportive of each 
elector’s independent judgment.  
In addition to preventing the election of the 
winning ticket’s vice presidential candidate as president 
(as nearly happened in 1800), Congress was also 
concerned with the election of one of the losing ticket’s 
candidates as vice president (as happened in 1796). See, 
e.g., 13 Annals of Cong. 85—87 (1803) (recording 
statement by Democratic-Republican Senator Butler of 
South Carolina that absent a constitutional amendment 
“the people called Federalists will send a Vice President 
into that chair”). In February 1802, during the Seventh 
Congress, the Federalists introduced amendments 
requiring designation of electoral votes and popular 
election of electors from single-elector districts. 11 Annals 
of Cong. 509, 602-603 (1802). In the waning days of the 
session, and with no substantive discussion or debate, a 
designation-only amendment comfortably passed the 
House, but fell a single vote short of the required two-
thirds in the Senate. Id. 304, 1288-94. The next year the 
Eighth Congress narrowly approved the Twelfth 
Amendment, with the Senate voting in favor by 22-10, and 
 
6Amici’s research to date reveals no evidence of the “different 
amendment” mentioned by Jefferson that would have eliminated 
electors. 
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the House Speaker leaving the chair to vote yea, making 
the vote 84-42. 13 Annals of Cong. 209, 776 (1803). 
The relevant debates reflect that Congress did not 
consider limiting elector independence. A statement by 
Representative Samuel Mitchill during the brief House 
debate7 on the Seventh Congress’s proposed designation 
amendment is sometimes mistakenly cited as questioning 
elector independence. See Baca, Pet. for Cert. at 29-30 
(quoting Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 228 n.15 (1952)); 
Chiafalo v. Washington, No. 19-465, Br. in Opp’n to Pet. 
for Writ of Cert. at 6-8, 18 (same); Baca, App. 158. In fact, 
Mitchill was advocating for designation of votes: 
Under the Constitution electors are to vote for 
two persons, one of whom does not reside in the 
State of the electors; but it does not require a 
designation of the persons voted for. Wise and 
virtuous as were the members of the 
Convention, experience has shown that the 
mode therein adopted cannot be carried into 
operation; for the people do not elect a person 
for an elector who, they know, does not intend 
to vote for a particular person as President. 
Therefore, practically, the very thing is 
adopted, intended by this amendment. 
11 Annals of Cong. 1289-1290 (1802). Read in its proper 
context, Mitchill’s statement reflects the ambient concern 
about tactical, partisan voting. It is not a comment against 
(or even about) elector independence.   
The near-inversion of the Jefferson-Burr ticket 
animated the Eighth Congress’s debates as it passed the 
Twelfth Amendment. For example, Representative 
 
7 The debate in the Committee of the Whole and the House proper 
spans only six pages in the Annals. 11 Annals of Cong. 1288-94 (1802).  
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Campbell told his colleagues that designation would 
“secure to the people the benefits of choosing the 
President, so as to prevent a contravention of their will as 
expressed by Electors chosen by them . . . .” 13 Annals of 
Cong. 421 (1803). Campbell further explained that, in the 
“extraordinary cases” of House contingent elections, 
designation would ensure “that those only should be 
capable of Legislative election who possessed a strong 
evidence of enjoying the confidence of the people.” Id. 
Representative Clopton operationalized Campbell’s 
observation, suggesting that a House contingent election 
“should be restrained to the smallest number above an 
unit, or to those persons who have equal electoral votes,” 
id. at 424, making it “more likely to insure the ultimate 
election of President and Vice President according to the 
will of the people . . . .” Id. at 377. This debate—about 
designation as a means to avoid inversion of president and 
vice president—had nothing to do with elector 
independence.  
The Eighth Congress also sought to attenuate the 
impact of strategic elector voting. Senator Butler of South 
Carolina put it bluntly, referencing 1796: “[I]f you do not 
alter the Constitution, the people called Federalists will 
send a Vice President into that chair. . . .” Id. at 87; see 
also id. at 98 (Senator William Cocke: “[T]he object of our 
amendment was to prevent a Federal[ist] Vice President 
being elected. . . .”). Although the Federalists in Congress 
voted unanimously against the Twelfth Amendment, they 
acknowledged the Democratic-Republican majority’s 
interest in thwarting machinations designed to seat a 
minority-party vice president alongside a majority-party 
president. See id. at 171, 178 (statements of Senator 
Tracy); 196 (statement of Senator Pickering).  
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The Twelfth Amendment thus embodies a balance 
between the Eighth Congress’s understanding that each 
elector was free to vote independently (even contrary to a 
pledged position) and its desire to prevent electors from 
engaging in tactical, partisan voting intended to put a 
winning ticket’s vice presidential candidate into the 
presidency,  or a losing-party candidate into the vice-
presidency alongside a winning majority-party candidate. 
As New York Secretary of State Thomas Tillotson 
recognized in a letter to James Madison shortly after 
Congress approved the Amendment: 
In consequence of the Electors designating the 
Characters they vote for as President and Vice 
President, the field for management and 
intrigue is very much circumscribed. Neither 
Mr. Burr or his adherents can well afford to 
sink down to their former indigence. December 
20, 1803.  
6 The Papers of James Madison, Secretary of State Series 
189. 
Ratifiers in the state legislatures also understood 
that designation addressed these twin concerns. As State 
Senator Bidwell commented during Massachusetts’ 
debate on the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment, “[i]t is 
a manifest absurdity, that votes given for a candidate, 
with a view to one office, should without the consent of the 
voters, through the agency of other electors, or by mere 
calamity, be liable to be thus converted into votes for 
another office not intended.” Massachusetts Legislature 
Debate on The Amendments to the Constitution, Boston 
Independent Chronicle (1804) (emphasis added). 
Finally, leading nineteenth century constitutional 
interpreters confirm this baseline understanding of the 
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elector as an independent actor. For example, Justice 
Story bemoaned the “notorious” fact that “the electors 
are now chosen wholly with reference to particular 
candidates” and that as a result “the whole foundation of 
the system, so elaborately constructed, is subverted.” 
Joseph Story, 3 Commentaries on the Constitution of the 
United States, § 1457 (1833). His premise—that electors 
may feel compelled to vote according to party alignment 
or pledges—accepts as a given the legal “foundation of the 
system,” namely, that electors choose for whom to vote. 
See also, William Rawle, A View of the Constitution of the 
United States of America 57–58 (2d ed. 1829) (arguing 
that public pledges of electors destroy the foundations of 
the electoral college, and noting that they are bound by 
political not legal compulsion); William Alexander Duer, 
A Course of Lectures on the Constitutional 
Jurisprudence of the United States; Delivered Annually 
in Columbia College, New York 96 (1843) (same); Thomas 
M. Cooley,The General Principles of Constitutional Law 
in the United States of America 161 (1898) (“The theory 
of the Constitution is that there shall be chosen by each 
State a certain number of its citizens . . . who shall 
independently cast their suffrages for President and Vice 
President of the United States, according to the dictates 
of their individual judgments.”) (emphasis omitted).  
Further, Senator Daniel Webster, one of 
Congress’s greatest constitutional interpreters, urged 
that Massachusetts’ pro-Webster Whig electors “should 
act with entire freedom from all considerations merely 
personal to myself; and that they should give the vote of 
the state in the manner they think most likely to be 
useful” in the context of the 1836 election. See 4 The 
Papers of Daniel Webster Series 1, Correspondence 161–
62 (Charles M. Wiltse ed. 1980) (letter published in the 
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December 17, 1836 Niles Weekly Register) (emphasis 
added). 
Properly contextualized, the Twelfth Amendment 
limited an elector’s ability to vote tactically to achieve a 
partisan outcome by requiring each elector to designate 
their votes for president and vice-president. That reform, 
like Article II’s original design of the electoral process, 
presumes that each elector can and will vote 
independently. 
B. The Deliberations and Actions of Subsequent 
Congresses Have Consistently Recognized Elector 
Independence. 
Proposals and deliberations in later congresses 
confirm an accepted background understanding: that 
Article II and the Twelfth Amendment protect elector 
independence. Even where these proposals were not 
adopted, the record provides useful historical evidence of 
the political consensus. For example, several amendments 
proposed in the early nineteenth century would have 
replaced election by the House, when no candidate 
received the votes of a majority of the electors appointed, 
in favor of sending the choice of president and vice 
president back to the electors. 41 Annals of Cong. 41, 43-
46, 74, 864-66, 1179-81 (1823-24). The mere consideration 
of that option only makes sense if Congress understood 
electors as free to change their votes even after adoption 
of the Twelfth Amendment.   
Congress also considered, and rejected, abolishing 
the office of elector while preserving electoral votes. See, 
e.g., Cong. Deb. 22nd Congress, 1st Sess. at 1963-64 
(1832) (statement of Rep. Erastus Root); id., 2d Sess. at 
940 (1833). Reporting on such a proposal in 1874, a Senate 
report noted “[t]hat the candidates for electors should be 
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pledged in advance to vote for particular persons was not 
only not contemplated by the framers of the constitution, 
but was explicitly excluded by their theory.” S. Rep. No. 
43-395, at 3 (1874). 
Indeed, Congress reaffirmed elector independence 
in 1932, during the adoption of the Twentieth 
Amendment. First, the language of the Amendment itself 
acknowledges elector independence in addressing House 
contingent elections: 
The Congress may by law provide for the case 
of the death of any of the persons from whom 
the House of Representatives may choose a 
President whenever the right of choice shall 
have devolved upon them, and for the case of 
the death of any of the persons from whom the 
Senate may choose a Vice President whenever 
the right of choice shall have devolved upon 
them. 
U.S. Const. amend. XX, § 4 (emphasis added).  
The “right of choice” is the right of each Member 
of Congress to choose a President or Vice President under 
the Twelfth Amendment. There is only one place from 
which this right of choice can “devolve[] upon” members 
of Congress—the right of choice possessed by each 
elector, as the Twelfth Amendment makes explicit (and 
Article II implies).  
Commenting on the need for this constitutional 
enhancement, the accompanying House Committee 
report noted: 
A constitutional amendment is not necessary to 
provide for the case of the death of a party 
nominee before the November elections. 
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Presidential electors and not the President are 
chosen at the November election. The electors, 
under the present Constitution would be free to 
choose a President, notwithstanding the death 
of a party nominee. Inasmuch as the electors 
would be free to choose a President, a 
constitutional amendment is not necessary to 
provide for the case of the death of a party 
nominee after the November elections and 
before the electors vote.  
H. Rep. No. 72-345, at 5 (1932) (emphasis added).  
Mid-twentieth century Senate debates also reflect 
the understanding that electors are independent. For 
example, as the Senate debated the Twenty-Second 
Amendment, Rhode Island Republican Theodore Green 
contemplated “[w]hether or not the President and Vice 
President should be elected by the Electoral College, as 
at present, and if so whether or not the members should 
be legally bound to vote in accordance with their 
instructions. … There is no provision in the law as to that.” 
93 Cong. Rec. 1964 (1947). A 1948 survey of state laws 
found that only California and Oregon had laws requiring 
pledges from electors and recommended wider adoption 
of laws requiring pledges, but observed that “[n]o action, 
however, could probably be taken to compel the election 
to abide by his pledge.” State Law on the Nomination, 
Election, and Instruction of Presidential Electors 42(3) 
The American Political Science Review 523, 529 (Ruth C. 
Silva, 1948).  
Elector freedom was also discussed during a 1956 
debate as the Senate considered two proposed 
constitutional amendments to prohibit the winner-take-
all, unit rule. Although opposed to elimination of the unit 
rule, John F. Kennedy did support a proposal to amend 
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the Constitution to prohibit elector discretion. 102 Cong. 
Rec. 5157 (March 20, 1956). Kennedy continued by noting 
that “half of the States have already removed the danger 
of electoral college delegates not reflecting the views of 
the States. States can take care of that situation 
themselves.” Id. (Emphasis added.) This drew a sharp 
response from Tennessee Democrat Albert Gore and New 
Jersey Republican Clifford Case: 
[Gore] … under the present system it is an 
elector's constitutional right to cast a ballot as 
he pleases. Legally he has the opportunity to do 
so. . . . 
[Case] I must disagree with the statement that 
an elector, even though there may be no law in 
his State requiring him to do so, is free to cast 
his vote as he wishes. He is not free, under our 
system. He is under the greatest obligation to 
conform with the-- 
[Gore] Which is a moral obligation. 
[Case] Yes; a moral obligation, which is the 
greatest of all.  
Id. (emphasis added). Gore and Case got it right. The 
ongoing discussion about the electoral process that began 
with the framing of Article II consistently shows that each 
elector is free to vote according to his or her independent 
judgment, and that the consequences of voting 
independently are political, not legal. 
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C. Congress Understood That State Legislatures 
Lacked the Power to Prevent an Elector From 
Exercising Independent Judgment When It Approved 
and Implemented the Twenty-Third Amendment. 
The story of the Twenty-Third Amendment 
continues the unbroken historical narrative of elector 
independence. That Amendment provides for the 
appointment of electors for the District of Columbia “as 
the Congress may direct.” U.S. Const., Amend. XXIII, § 
1. Thus, Congress first used its constitutional authority to 
amend the Constitution and award electors to the District 
of Columbia. Then it passed legislation to implement that 
provision and direct the manner of appointment for the 
District’s electors.  
To accomplish the first step, the Twenty-Third 
Amendment provides that the District of Columbia shall 
appoint: 
A number of electors of President and Vice 
President equal to the whole number of 
Senators and Representatives in Congress to 
which the District would be entitled if it were a 
State . . . and they shall meet in the District and 
perform such duties as provided by the twelfth 
article of amendment. 
Id.  
The House Judiciary Committee report 
accompanying the resolution that eventually became the 
Amendment expressly noted that the proposed language 
“follows closely, insofar as it is applicable, the language of 
article II of the Constitution.” H.R. Rep. No. 86-1698, at 4 
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(1960).8 Two representatives reiterated this equivalence 
during the House’s sole, two-hour debate on the Twenty-
Third Amendment. 106 Cong. Rec. 12553, 12558, 12571 
(June 14, 1960). The Senate then approved it after no 
more than an hour of debate, and without a recorded vote, 
on June 16, 1960. Id. at 12850-58.  
Needless to say, there is no evidence in the 
Congressional Record of any comment or discussion 
suggesting that the amendment empowered Congress to 
bind the District’s electors. 
Congress returned to the subject of the District’s 
electors when it enacted enabling legislation in 1961. The 
resulting statute provides that an elector must “take an 
oath or solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the 
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to 
represent, and it shall be his or her duty to vote in such 
manner in the electoral college.” D.C. Code § 1–1001.08(g) 
(2017). Critically, the relevant hearings reveal a 
consensus view that Congress could, at most, enact a 
statute applying “moral suasion” to each D.C. elector’s 
voting choices but could not prevent an elector from 
voting independently. 
That question first arose when Representative J. 
Carlton Loser inquired during the testimony of Walter 
Tobriner, President of the District of Columbia Board of 
Commissioners, “Is there some Constitutional provision 
 
8 Committee reports are considered a particularly reliable source of 
Congress’ intended meaning. Garcia v. United States, 469 U.S. 70, 76 
(1984) (“In surveying legislative history we have repeatedly stated 
that the authoritative source for finding the Legislature’s intent lies 
in the Committee Reports on the bill, which represent the considered 
and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in 
drafting and studying proposed legislation.”) (internal quotation 
omitted). 
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involving the question of electors, how they shall vote?” 
To Amend the Act of August 12, 1955 Relating to 
Elections in the District of Columbia, hearing on H.R. 
5955, House of Representatives Subcommittee No. 3 on 
the Committee of the District of Columbia, 87th Cong. 34-
37 (1961). The subsequent colloquy among Tobriner, 
Loser, and Representative George Huddleston made 
clear that such a provision would have no legal effect: 
[Rep. Huddleston] … Once the electors are 
appointed and certified as the electors of that 
party, if that party carries the election these 
electors are still authorized to vote for 
whomever they please. 
[Rep. Loser] But this Administration bill 
requires them to vote for the party which they 
represent. 
[Rep. Huddleston] I think that has a moral 
suasion. I don’t think that has any legal effect 
at all. 
…. 
[Rep. Loser] Are you saying, sir, that the 
provision of the bill is ineffective or is not 
compulsory that the electors vote for the 
candidate of the party they represent? 
[Mr. Tobriner] There is not provision in the bill, 
sir, setting forth any compulsory means by 
which this may be enforced. 
[Rep. Huddleston] I think probably that is 
preferable to some naked statement that the 
electors are required to support a candidate, 
because that has no legal effect at all; whereas 
your oath would accomplish this same purpose 
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because it also gives rise to a moral suasion. 
When a man takes an oath, although that oath 
has no legal effect either, still a person thinks a 
long time before he violates an oath he has 
given. I think your provision would accomplish 
the same purpose from a legal point of view as 
the Administration bill. 
Id. at 34-37 (emphasis added).  
The Senate passed the bill 66-6 without discussing 
the possibility of legal consequences for an anomalous 
elector. 107 Cong. Rec. 20217 (Sept. 19, 1961). When the 
bill came back from the conference committee, the 
reporting senator noted that “it was agreed that a duty 
would be imposed on a person chosen as an elector to vote 
in the electoral college for the candidate of the political 
party which he represents” and the Senate approved the 
report without further discussion. Id. at 21052 (Sept. 23, 
1961). However, the statute provides no legal 
consequences, requiring only that an elector must “take 
an oath or solemnly affirm that he or she will vote for the 
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to 
represent, and it shall be his or her duty to vote in such 
manner in the electoral college.” D.C. Code § 1–
1001.08(g). As Representative Huddleston articulated, 
the statute was designed to make an elector “think a long 
time” before casting a vote for someone other than “the 
candidates of the party he or she has been nominated to 
represent.” To go further, by, for example, barring 
electors from voting otherwise or punishing them for 
doing so, would have had “no legal effect at all” in light of 
the text and structure of Article II and the Twelfth 
Amendment. Congress thus respected that boundary in 
adopting and implementing the Twenty-Third 
Amendment.  
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As the Twenty-Third Amendment was being 
ratified by the states in 1961, the Senate Judiciary 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Amendments considered 
twenty-three resolutions making a total of twenty-five 
proposals regarding presidential elections.  A single 
report covered many of them. S. Rep. No. 87-1305 (1962). 
The section titled “The office of presidential elector” 
opened with the following comment: 
Under present constitutional provisions, the 
elector is free to exercise his independent 
judgment in voting, regardless of whether he is 
instructed by State law or has given a pledge, 
or whether his own name was even on the 
ballot. This power to frustrate the popular will 
has seldom been used, but its continued 
existence is unnecessary under any system.  
Id. at 9 (emphasis added). 
This section concluded “All pending proposals 
would eliminate the possibility of independent or 
unpledged electors.” Id. at 10. None of these proposals 
was sent to the states.  In sum, Congress has never taken 
an action suggesting that the Constitution, as originally 
adopted or as amended, empowers a state to prohibit or 
penalize an elector for exercising discretion. 
III. Congress Has Never Failed to Count an 
Anomalous Electoral Vote. 
Congress’s consistent practice of counting 
anomalous electoral votes is additional compelling 
evidence that electors enjoy independence in deciding 
how to cast their votes. In the wake of the Twelfth 
Amendment, at least four nineteenth century elections 
saw electors vote anomalously for president, and at least 
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eight saw anomalous votes for vice-president.9 Critically, 
Congress tallied and accepted all those votes without 
question. See Vasan Kesavan, Is the Electoral Count Act 
Unconstitutional?, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 1654, 1678-94 (2002) 
(hereafter Kesavan) (surveying congressional debates 
questioning legitimacy of electoral votes). In fact, 
Congress has never refused to count and accept the 
electoral votes cast by an anomalous elector. By counting 
those votes, Congress effectuates the selection of the 
president and vice-president. Id. at 1658. This unbroken 
record of accepting anomalous votes confirms Congress’s 
longstanding view that state laws may apply moral 
suasion, but they do not, because they cannot, override 
the authority conferred on electors by the Constitution to 
vote as they choose. Indeed, Congress has consistently 
counted anomalous electoral votes up through the 2016 
election.10 163 Cong. Rec. H189-90 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017). 
This Court’s decision in McPherson v. Blacker, 146 
U.S. 1 (1892), did not alter this practice, nor otherwise 
 
9 For president these were 1808, 1816, 1820, and 1872.  For vice 
president they were 1812, 1816, 1820, 1824, 1828, 1840, 1872, and 1896. 
10 For a compendium through 1992, see 139 Cong. Rec. 961 (1993). In 
2000, one of the electors abstained and the joint convention of 
Congress took no notice. 147 Cong. Rec. 33-34 (Jan. 6, 2001). In 2004 
John Edwards received a presidential electoral vote and a vice 
presidential electoral vote from the same elector and once again 
Congress recorded the votes per its usual practice. 151 Cong. Rec., 
H85 (Jan. 6, 2005). In 2016 seven electors voted anomalously for 
president and six did so for vice president, and Congress accepted all 
of these electoral votes without comment. See 163 Cong. Rec., H186-
90 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 2017). Five electors from Hawaii and Washington 
cast their votes in violation of State law. There was no statute in Texas 
applying to its two Republican electors, who failed to vote for Donald 
Trump. The process by which Congress counts votes and may choose 
to reject them is set forth in the Electoral Count Act of 1887, codified 
at 3 U.S.C. §§ 5-6, 15-18.  
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undermine elector independence. The issue in McPherson 
was not elector independence, but whether electors could 
be chosen by district. Id. at 24-25. Read in that context, 
the holding in McPherson was that the district system of 
choosing electors remained constitutionally valid even 
though it had been dormant for a long time. Id. at 36. To 
the extent it had anything to say about the independence 
of electors, those statements were dicta.  
The first election following McPherson illustrated 
that the decision did not limit elector independence. In 
1896, William Jennings Bryan received the presidential 
nominations of both the Democratic Party and the 
Populist Party. Arthur Sewall of Maine was his running 
mate on the Democratic line. On the Populist line, it was 
Thomas Watson of Georgia.11 Bryan’s strategy was to run 
a single slate of electors in as many states as possible, 
some pledged to Bryan and Sewall, others pledged to 
Bryan and Watson.12 Washington was one such state, with 
two Bryan electors pledged to Sewall and two to Watson. 
Bryan carried Washington, and its four electors faithfully 
cast their electoral votes for vice president as pledged.13  
A different situation occurred in Kansas, where 
two separate Bryan lines (Democrat and Populist) 
appeared on the ballot with the same set of electors. 
Breidenthal v. Edwards, 57 Kan. 332, 46 P. 469 (1896). 
Knowing that the Bryan electors all intended to vote for 
Sewall rather than Watson, Kansas Populist Party 
chairman John Breidenthal brought suit to have Watson’s 
name removed from the ballot. The Kansas Supreme 
 
11 Karl Rove, The Triumph of William McKinley: Why the Election 
of 1896 Still Matters 295–96, 302, 304–05 (Simon & Schuster 2015).  
12 William Jennings Bryan, The First Battle. A Story of the Campaign 
of 1896 293 (W. B. Conkey Company 1896).  
13 See 29 Cong. Rec. 1694, 1715 (Feb. 10, 1897). 
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Court ruled against Breidenthal seven days before the 
general election, reasoning that “if these electors should 
be chosen, they will be under no legal obligation to 
support Sewall, Watson, or any other person named by a 
political party, but they may vote for any eligible citizen 
of the United States.” Id. at 470.   
In the end, when the electoral votes were tallied, 
the Bryan electors in Colorado, Idaho, and North 
Carolina did not cast their vice-presidential votes as 
originally pledged. See “Election in All States,” The New 
York Times (Nov. 4, 1896). Nevertheless, their votes were 
counted by Congress without question. That result, and 
the Breidenthal decision, powerfully indicate that 
McPherson did not curtail elector independence.  
Only once has Congress even debated the question 
of whether to accept a vote cast by an anomalous elector.14 
In 1968 an elector cast his votes for George Wallace and 
Curtis LeMay rather than Richard Nixon and Spiro 
Agnew. When Congress met to count the electoral vote 
Senator Edmund Muskie and Representative James 
O’Hara filed a formal objection to counting the elector’s 
vote, arguing the Twelfth Amendment constitutionalized 
 
14 Notably, Congress has not hesitated debating questions relating to 
the legitimacy of electoral votes for other reasons. See Kesavan at 
1679-92 (describing several examples from 1809 through 1877). For 
example, in 1856 a blizzard hit Madison, Wisconsin making it 
impossible for Wisconsin’s electors to meet. They cast their electoral 
votes the next day, one day after the day prescribed by law, and 
Congress spent the better part of two days debating whether or not 
to accept the votes. See Cong. Globe, 34th Cong., 3rd Sess., 644–60, 
662–68 (1857). Similarly, in 1873, Congress decided not to count votes 
for Horace Greeley, who had died after the November election, but 
before the electors met, and had received a handful of electoral votes 
from electors who voted for him even knowing that he was dead, but 
only after close votes. This is the only time that Congress rejected an 
electoral vote because of the name on the ballot. Kesavan at 1687.  
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an obligation for each elector to vote according to the 
popular vote in his or her state. 115 Cong. Rec. 146 (Jan. 
6, 1969). In the end, the objection failed by votes of 33-58 
in the Senate (id. at 246) and 170-228 in the House. Id. at 
170-71, 246.  Thus, since the 1873 debate about electoral 
votes for the recently deceased Horace Greeley, the only 
time that Congress debated the question of whether to 
count the votes of an anomalous elector it counted the 
votes, decisively rejecting the idea that the Twelfth 
Amendment imposed an obligation on electors to vote in 
accordance with State popular vote tallies. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, the historical record confirms that, under 
our constitutional framework, each elector is free to vote 
as he or she chooses. Therefore, this Court should reverse 
in Chiafalo and affirm in Baca. 
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